Non-state actors and biological threats: Revisiting bioterrorism in the twenty-first Century

Abstract

Bioterrorism remains a significant but contested dimension of international security, particularly as advances in synthetic biology, genome editing, artificial intelligence, and biological design are changing the technological environment in which biological threats emerge. This study re-examines the capacity of non-state actors to pose biological threats and addresses a gap in conventional debates that often focus either on the severity of the threat or on the practical barriers to its realization. Drawing on securitization theory, the study examines how biological threats posed by non-state actors are constructed as security concerns and how technological change may affect the relationship between intent and capability. It uses a qualitative comparative analysis of the Rajneeshee cult, Aum Shinrikyo, and Islamic State, together with an assessment of contemporary international biosecurity governance. The analysis finds that historical cases were constrained by limitations in specialized knowledge, access, dissemination, and organizational capacity, indicating that intent alone was insufficient to produce sustained biological violence. Emerging technologies may reduce some of these barriers, but technological progress does not automatically translate into operational capability; access, expertise, organizational capacity, and other institutional constraints remain important. The study further finds that existing frameworks, including the Biological Weapons Convention, dual-use research governance, and the Global Health Security Agenda, provide important foundations but remain fragmented in addressing emerging risks. The paper concludes that effective prevention requires stronger biosecurity governance, improved screening and verification mechanisms, preparedness, and sustained coordination among governments, scientific institutions, industry, and international organizations.