U.S.-Pakistan Relations During the War on Terror: Strategic Partnership or Tactical Alliance

Abstract

This article examines U.S.–Pakistan relations from September 2001 through the major post-2014 realignments of U.S. policy in South Asia, asking whether the bilateral relationship amounted to a durable strategic partnership or a more limited, episodic tactical alliance. Drawing on government documents, Congressional Research Service analyses, scholarship by regional experts, and contemporaneous reporting, the paper traces the evolution of cooperation across five interlocking dimensions: security cooperation and military aid; intelligence collaboration and covert operations (including drone strikes); political-diplomatic interaction and crises (notably the 2011 Abbottabad raid); economic and civilian assistance (including the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009); and domestic political constraints inside Pakistan that shaped Islamabad’s behavior. The evidence presented suggests that while the relationship featured elements of a strategic partnership—shared short-term goals, sustained aid flows, and institutional links—it was characterized more accurately as a tactical alliance, relationship dynamics were episodic, transactional, deeply asymmetric, and repeatedly undermined by mutual mistrust and diverging long-term objectives. The paper concludes with implications for future U.S. policy and recommendations for managing asymmetric partnerships where short-term operational interests collide with deeper strategic divergence.